Citizens’ Perceptions of Government Responses to COVID-19 in Eight Countries

This study examines citizens’ perceptions of government responses in a multi-national context, by surveying residents in eight democratic nations affected by the pandemic: Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Spain, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  

The Academic Job Market in Public Affairs: What Characteristics are Desired?

This study reports the results of a survey of several hundred public affairs faculty concerning what they look for when evaluating candidates for academic positions. Although fit with program needs is the most important criteria followed by publications, there is a great deal of diversity on what faculty value in job candidates. Faculty from PhD granting institutions place more emphasis on research and publications while those at non-PhD granting programs focus more on department fit and teaching experience.  Faculty with greater experience are more likely to emphasize letters of recommendation and the quality of the dissertation.

Testing the Theoretical Determinants of Political Control over the Bureaucracy: Taking Wood and Waterman Seriously

This paper has never been published but it contains an idea that would be useful in the political control literature.


After a series of sophisticated studies on the interface between bureaucracy and electoral institutions, Dan Wood, and Dan Wood along with Rick Waterman, concluded that it had been established that electoral institutions can control the bureaucracy, and research was now needed to move to the more interesting questions about what factors facilitate or limit this control.  Since this call to arms, little progress has been made – probably because taking Wood’s proposal seriously requires an extensive data set that measures a wide range of variables such as bureaucratic expertise, external political support for the bureaucracy, political preferences, clientele support, budget autonomy, and incentives – among others.
    Using a unique data set of over 1000 public organizations, plus an interrupted time-series assessment of political control that is analogous to those used by Wood, this paper systematically tests several hypotheses about political control of the bureaucracy.  All other things being equal, theory suggests that one would expect political control to be enhanced when a) bureaucrats share values with politicos; b) organizations exhibit relatively less cohesion, leadership, technical expertise, and external political support; and c) organizations are small, less complicatedly bureaucratic, and centralized.  Resources available to the bureaucracy can also be expected to matter for political control.  This paper tests a series of such hypotheses from spatial theory, Rourke’s theory of bureaucratic power, and organization theory. 



Abstract here